孫懋嘉

Mao-Chia Sun

公民參與、中共網路監控、自我審查、言論自由、寒蟬效應

civic participation, China’s online surveillance, self-censorship, freedom of expression, chilling effect

近年來，隨著國內外媒體陸續揭露中共對海外的網路及社群平臺進行監控，已可發現中共不僅持續監控臺灣主流社群平臺的輿論動態，亦對公眾人物的社群互動與個人資訊進行系統性的蒐集與分析。然而，學界目前對中共網路監控對臺灣社會所造成的影響仍所知有限。鑑此，本研究旨在探討臺灣民眾如何回應中共對臺灣網路的監控，透過對40位受訪者的深度訪談，分析其面對中共網路監控時的情緒、行為、認知歷程及應對策略。

研究發現，中共網路監控感知會引發不同的負面情緒，並促使民眾在網路言論與行為上產生自我審查，其影響亦延伸至線下的人際互動層面。然而，部分民眾並未完全陷入寒蟬效應之中，而是透過隱喻、戲謔或限制貼文可見範圍等方式，規避監控機制以維持自我表達與社群連結。在應對策略方面，民眾傾向避免使用中國大陸相關產品與平臺、加強設備與軟體安全防護，並期待政府建立更完善的資安法規、審查制度與資料保護機制。整體而言，中共對臺網路監控感知不僅在個人層面會引發負面情緒與寒蟬效應，亦在社會層面限縮言論自由與公民參與的意願。

Media coverage in recent years has reported that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) surveils overseas online spaces, monitors public opinion on Taiwan’s major social media platforms, and collects data on Taiwanese public figures. These practices suggest that the CCP’s digital authoritarianism extends beyond its borders and to Taiwan, posing threats to national security and democratic functioning. Few studies examine how such surveillance shapes Taiwanese citizens’ emotional and behavioral responses and at the societal level affects freedom of expression and civic participation.
This research investigates how Taiwanese citizens perceive and respond to the CCP’s online surveillance by analyzing their perceptions, emotional reactions, and behavioral adjustments and assesses the implications for freedom of expression and civic participation. In doing so, it addresses key gaps in the literature on the individual- and societal-level impacts of transnational online surveillance and provides empirical evidence of the CCP’s outward extension of digital authoritarianism.
This paper presents in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 40 Taiwanese participants recruited through interpersonal networks via purposive sampling to ensure occupational diversity. Interviews were conducted between September and October 2024, lasted about 60 minutes, and participants received a NT$500 gift voucher. Before their interview, participants gave informed consent, completed a short survey on media use and demographics, and read four news articles on the CCP’s overseas online surveillance to establish a baseline understanding. Transcripts were coded and analyzed using ATLAS.ti.
From the interview data, this study identifies the following key findings.
(1) Patterns and Implications of Negative Emotional Responses
Once participants perceived CCP online surveillance, they commonly reported negative emotions such as fear, anxiety, anger, sadness, disgust, helplessness, and surprise. Under transnational surveillance targeting Taiwan, their reactions often became risk assessments of potential harm. Fear and concern stem largely from worries about personal safety, privacy breaches, and being misidentified as a political dissident, indicating that surveillance is seen as a concrete threat. Anger, sadness, and disgust reflect perceptions that undermine Taiwan’s democratic values and intrudes on everyday life, while helplessness and surprise signal powerlessness and disbelief. Overall, even without formal legal jurisdiction over Taiwanese citizens, the CCP’s transnational online surveillance exhibits the threatening features of digital transnational repression, generating substantial psychological distress and insecurity.
(2) Online and Offline Self-Censorship
Perceived CCP online surveillance has reshaped participants’ online practices and to some extent their offline interactions. Online self-censorship comes in two forms: personal expression and online behavior. Participants often avoided criticizing the CCP or discussing politically sensitive issues, with some even further withdrawing from Taiwanese and international political topics. They also adjusted their digital routines by avoiding China-based social platforms, reducing CCP-related searches, and steering clear of sensitive keywords. On social media, they posted, liked, commented, and shared less to minimize traceable footprints, while on messaging apps they became more cautious about sharing personal or private information. Concerns for personal and family safety, perceived risks tied to future engagement with China, and fears of political labeling drive such behaviors.
While most participants saw face-to-face communication as less constrained, offline some took precautions like turning off or moving cell phones away, due to concerns about audio capture or data leakage. When sensitive topics arose, they also calibrated their speech based on trust, speaking more openly with close contacts and avoiding or moderating discussion with less trusted interlocutors.
(3) Resistance and Countermeasures in Response to CCP Online Surveillance
While perceived CCP online surveillance induces self-censorship, some participants were not fully deterred by any chilling effect. Instead, they employed creative coping strategies, such as metaphors, jokes, indirect language, or restricting post visibility, to evade monitoring while sustaining self-expression and social ties. This underscores continued individual agency under surveillance, as participants used tactical forms of everyday resistance that serve both as psychological protection and a symbolic challenge to transnational surveillance (de Certeau, 1984; Scott, 1985).
Heightened awareness of surveillance in some cases even intensified participants’ willingness to speak out, with them using sarcasm, humor, or provocation to confront perceived threats. This resonates with Penney’s (2017) argument that surveillance can sometimes provoke defiance rather than silence. Overall, the CCP’s online surveillance does not uniformly suppress expression and may under certain conditions elicit more agentic and oppositional responses.
(4) Individual and Institutional Strategies for Responding to CCP Online Surveillance
Participants’ individual-level responses to the CCP’s online surveillance primarily involved hardware and software choices. They favor electronic devices with stronger privacy protections and in some cases use separate devices for China-based apps to reduce data leakage and behavioral tracking. They also avoid pirated software and China-based platforms, strengthened cybersecurity settings, and have limited interactions with individuals with extreme political views to reduce potential repercussions. These practices align with other findings in which surveillance encourages stronger privacy protection and fewer identifiable digital traces (Dinev et al., 2008; Paine et al., 2007).
At the institutional level, participants stress the need for stronger data protection and cybersecurity review regimes, backed by enforcement and oversight. They further call for cyber sovereignty regulations to keep data storage and control within Taiwan’s jurisdiction. They also want more proactive governmental defense and countermeasures, a stronger role for domestic firms to prevent external interference, and sustained public education to enhance digital security awareness and literacy.
(5) Impacts of CCP Online Surveillance on Freedom of Expression and Civic Participation
Perceived CCP online surveillance is seen as undermining freedom of expression and civic participation in Taiwan. Most participants note that citizens are more cautious when discussing politically sensitive issues, making some viewpoints harder to express and reducing engagement in public debate. This is consistent with Murry et al.’s (2024) argument that online surveillance constrains deliberative space. If self-censorship continues to spread, then Taiwan’s discursive environment may become further restricted.
Participants also suggest that surveillance threats may intensify polarization, creating a dynamic in which “the outspoken become more outspoken while the silent grow quieter” and discouraging expression among moderate voters. Some further warn that the CCP could exploit online monitoring to manipulate information during elections, shaping perceptions and influencing voting behavior. Over time, these dynamics may weaken civic engagement and undermine democratic functioning (Black, 2025; Büchi et al., 2022; Königs, 2022).